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Decentralization: Political Accountability, Corruption and Economic Outcomes


Decentralization impacts the political and economic environment in many ways. One of its possible consequences is a reduction in the information asymmetries between citizens and politicians. The aim of this workshop is to analyze the extent to which decentralization affects the accountability of political institutions, levels of corruption, and economic outcomes like innovation, economic growth, and the reduction of poverty. Several related questions may also be discussed during the workshop, such as the effectiveness of lobbies in a decentralized environment, the ability of a decentralized system to react to macroeconomic shocks, the determinants of decentralization, and so on.

The aim of this workshop is to bring together a set of empirical and theoretical papers to cast light on these issues.

Topics of interest

  • Is policy diffusion enhanced by decentralization?
  • Political economy of grant allocation
  • Is lobbying more or less effective under decentralization?
  • Corruption in the public sector: determinants and consequences
  • Macroeconomic management under decentralization
  • Taxes vs. grants: how do they affect the process of accountability?
  • Decentralization and political accountability
  • Vertical and horizontal tax competition: identification and source of interaction
  • Decentralization: a remedy or a way to promote corruption?  


  • Deadline for submission of papers: April 1, 2011
  • Deadline for acceptance of papers: April 25, 2011
  • Registration: April 6 to June 17, 2011

Registration and further information

The registration fee of 425 Euros covers documentation, coffee breaks and working lunches. Participants who present papers are exempt from this payment, and will also be provided free accommodation. Papers should be sent to [email protected]. Only papers presented in PDF format will be considered. This web page will be regularly updated, all interested scholars are invited to surf it, to be informed of the latest news.

Scientific Committee

  • Núria Bosch-Roca (University of Barcelona & IEB)
  • Alejandro Esteller-Moré (University of Barcelona & IEB)
  • Brian Knight (Brown University)
  • Eva Mörk (Uppsala University & IFAU)
  • Michael Smart (University of Toronto)
  • Albert Solé-Ollé (University of Barcelona & IEB)
  • Pilar Sorribas-Navarro (University of Barcelona & IEB)
  • Daniel Treisman (UCLA)

Organizing Committee

  • Alejandro Esteller-Moré (University of Barcelona & IEB)
  • Amedeo Piolatto (University of Barcelona & IEB)
  • Pilar Sorribas-Navarro (University of Barcelona & IEB)


Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB)

The Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) is an applied economics research centre at the University of Barcelona. Its aim is promote, develop and disseminate economic research, placing particular emphasis on economic policy decisions. The IEB was created in 2001 to continue the work carried out...

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